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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over Defendant Myriam 
Onyeabor's ("Ms. Onyeabor") appeal and Plaintiffs' LEBR Associates, LLC ("LEBR") 
and Centennial Pointe Property Owners Association's (Registered on November 29, 
2004) (the "Association") (both parties collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs") cross-
appeal, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)0). On October 25, 2007, the 
Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(4), and Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal and cross-appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (granting jurisdiction over "cases transferred to the Court of 
Appeals from the Supreme Court"). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Ms. Onyeabor appeals the Order of Judge Robert P. Faust granting Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and striking, inter alia, the affidavits Ms. 
Onyeabor proffered in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion. See Onyeabor Brief at 13, 14. 
Ms. Onyeabor has set forth sixteen single-spaced issues for review, all of which fail to 
provide citation to the record to indicate where Ms. Onyeabor purportedly preserved these 
issues below. See Ms. Onyeabor's Brief at 11-13. Ms. Onyeabor provides no standard of 
review for these issues. Many of these issues are raised for the first time on appeal and 
are inadequately briefed. Ms. Onyeabor's Brief does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 
24 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Ms. Onyeabor's Brief does not comport with 
1 
Utah law. See James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (matters raised 
for the first time on appeal will not be considered); Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 
1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (matters inadequately briefed shall not be considered). For 
these reasons, Plaintiffs request that this Court strike and not consider the issues raised by 
Ms. Onyeabor in her Brief. 
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Plaintiffs provide 
this Court with their Statement of Issues for Review: 
ISSUE NO. 1. 
Did the trial court correctly grant partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs 
determining, as a matter of law, that the Restated Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions 
of Centennial Pointe, a planned unit development, recorded in August 2002 (the 
"Restated Amended CC&Rs") are valid and encumber all Lots in the Centennial Pointe 
development, including Lots 1 and 2 owned by Ms. Onyeabor? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correctness. This Court reviews a trial court's ruling 
granting summary judgment for correctness. See Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, 
Inc., 2007 UT App 407, ^ 31, 175 P.3d 572. 
ISSUE NO. 2. 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it granted Plaintiffs' Motions to Strike 
the affidavits of Onyeabor, Robert Mills, Travis Healey and Chinedum Alexander Udeh 
proffered in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Abuse of discretion. When this Court reviews a trial 
court's decision to strike affidavits, that decision "is reviewed under a broad grant of 
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discretion." Murdoch v. Springville Mun, Corp., 1999 UT 39, f25, 982 P.2d 65 (citations 
omitted). 
ISSUES ON CROSS APPEAL 
ISSUE NO. 1. 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it reduced the Association's attorney 
fees' award by an arbitrary 50% without consideration of the factors set forth in Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988)? 
This issue was preserved by Plaintiffs' request for attorney fees in their Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment (R. 865-70), and Plaintiffs' counsel's affidavit of attorney fees 
filed with the trial court. (R. 2017-64) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Abuse of discretion. This Court reviews a trial 
court's determination of reasonable attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. See Dixie 
State Bankv. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). 
ISSUE NO. 2. 
Did the trial court err when it denied Plaintiffs' claim for late fees and fines 
imposed against Ms. Onyeabor under the express terms of Centennial Pointe's CC&Rs 
for violating the CC&Rs, on the basis that the late fees and fines were not damages 
resulting from Ms. Onyeabor's breach of contract? 
This issue was preserved below in Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. (R. 865-70) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correctness. The trial court's interpretation of 
restrictive covenants is a question of law. See Holladay Duplex Mgrnt., Co., LLC v. 
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Howells, 2002 UT App 125, f 2, 47 P.3d 104. Appellate courts review a trial court's 
ruling on questions of law for correctness. See id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case/Course of Proceedings. 
Ms. Onyeabor appeals from an Order, certified as final under Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
declaring the Restated Amended CC&Rs for Centennial Pointe valid and encumbering 
Ms. Onyeabor's Lots 1 and 2 in the development, and striking, inter alia, the affidavits 
Ms. Onyeabor proffered in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion.1 See Onyeabor Brief at 14. 
Plaintiffs have cross-appealed the trial court's ruling reducing the attorney fees award by 
an arbitrary 50%, and its denial of Plaintiffs' claim for late fees and fines imposed against 
^he trial court's determination that the Restated Amended CC&Rs were valid and 
encumbered Ms. Onyeabor's property was based upon the proper exercise of the 
amendment power reserved unto the original owner/developer and upon Ms. Onyeabor 
having notice of the Restated Amended CC&Rs, as well as Ms. Onyeabor's ratification of 
the Restated Amended CC&Rs. (R. 2521-90) Ms. Onyeabor has variously stated that she 
did not, and that she did, sign the Restated Amended CC&Rs. For example, she argues in 
her Brief that she never denied signing the original CC&Rs, Onyeabor Brief at 27, 
however, the only CC&Rs bearing her signature are the Restated Amended CC&Rs. (R. 
1136) Ms. Onyeabor did not sign the original CC&Rs recorded in April, 2000. (R. 919) 
Ms. Onyeabor has claimed that she has no recollection of signing the Restated Amended 
CC&Rs. (R. 1308) That said, Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was not 
premised upon whether or not she signed the Restated Amended CC&Rs. That was 
conceded to be a disputed fact. However, the trial court correctly determined that the 
Restated Amended CC&Rs were valid and encumbered Ms. Onyeabor' property without 
reaching any decision as to whether Ms. Onyeabor signed the Restated Amended CC&Rs. 
(R. 2591-2602) Accordingly, Ms. Onyeabor's argument regarding the same should not be 
considered. 
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Ms. Onyeabor under the express terms of Centennial Pointe's CC&Rs. See Plaintiffs' 
Docketing Statement. 
Centennial Pointe is a light industrial planned unit development, which its 
owner/developer intended to be managed by an owners association and the lots therein to 
be burdened by restrictive covenants. Exhibit 2; (R. 840-41, 885) Ms. Onyeabor owns 
two lots in Centennial Pointe. (R. 841-43) Ms. Onyeabor has challenged the validity of 
Centennial Pointe's restrictive covenants and ceased paying her assessments, resulting in 
the present matter. (R. 1-13) 
On and off through this litigation, Ms. Onyeabor has proceeded with counsel and 
acted pro se. (R. 2017-64). In prosecuting this case to and including the dispositive N 
prosecuting Leading up to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs 
have filed a motion for preliminary injunction and an evidentiary hearing was conducted 
thereon, motions to dismiss were filed, opposed and hearings were conducted thereon, 
Plaintiffs have filed a motion to compel discovery because Onyeabor refused to sit for her 
deposition, Plaintiffs have conducted depositions, and Plaintiffs' have conducted written 
discovery. (R. 2017-64) 
On October 30, 2006, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
seeking an Order declaring, inter alia, that Centennial Pointe's Restated Amended 
CC&Rs are valid and encumber Ms. Onyeabor's Lots 1 and 2 in the development. (R. 
831-1277) Plaintiffs requested an award of attorney fees under the provisions of the 
Restated Amended CC&Rs, and that Ms. Onyeabor be ordered to pay the late fees and 
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fines imposed against Ms. Onyeabor under the express terms of the CC&Rs. (R. 865-68) 
On December 13, 2006, Ms. Onyeabor filed her Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion, a 
Cross-Motion, and appended thereto were several affidavits. (R. 1306-1474) Ms. 
Onyeabor did not dispute or controvert the facts and evidence set forth in Plaintiffs' 
Motion. On January 17, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their Reply Memorandum and Opposition 
to Ms. Onyeabor's Cross-Motion, and several Motions to Strike evidence proffered by 
Ms. Onyeabor in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion. (R. 1584-1786) 
Ms. Onyeabor did not file any specific opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions to Strike, 
but on January 23, 2007, she did file a pleading entitled Motion and Memorandum in 
Support of Ms. Onyeabor's Request to File Answer to Plaintiffs' and Third-Party 
Defendants Bruce Raile's and Jennifer Clark's Answer Memorandum of January 17, 2007 
("January 23, 2007 Onyeabor Memorandum"). (R. 1787, 1790) In that Memorandum, 
Ms. Onyeabor argued that the affidavits of Robert Mills, Travis Healey, and Chinedum 
Alexander Udeh should not be stricken because they "have every right to state in plain 
English what conversations they had with whom. They also have a right to recount events 
as they witnessed them. It is not hearsay if they were part of the conversation." (R.1790) 
On February 2, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their Reply Memorandum in support of their 
Motions to Strike. (R. 1805-12) 
On May 2, 2007, the trial court heard oral argument on Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motions to Strike. (R. 1972, 1975-77) The 
trial court took the matters under advisement. On May 3, 2007, the Court issued a Minute 
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Entry granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and awarding them their 
attorney fees, and granting their Motions to Strike. (R. 1975-77) The trial court denied 
Plaintiffs' claim for late fees and fines imposed against Ms. Onyeabor. (R. 1975-77) 
On June 20, 2007, Plaintiffs filed an affidavit of attorney fees, which included 
redacted billing statements. Exhibit 4 (R. 2017-64) On August 7, 2007, the trial court 
issued a Minute Entry stating that Plaintiffs' attorney fees were exorbitant and reduced 
the fee by 50%. (R. 2396-98). On October 1, 2007, the trial court executed and entered 
the Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motions to 
Strike. Exhibit 1 (R. 2521-90) The Order reflected the 50% reduction of the attorney 
fees award. (R. 2529) The trial court certified the Order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 2528-29, 2531) 
On October 16, 2007, Ms. Onyeabor filed her Notice of Intent to Appeal. (R. 
2605-07) On October 25, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Cross-Appeal. (R. 2789-
91). 
STATEMENT OF FACT^ 
The following facts were not disputed by Ms. Onyeabor. (R. 1306-1474) 
1. Centennial Pointe Industrial Park ("Centennial Pointe") is a commercial, light 
industrial planned unit development located at or about 1755 South 4490 West, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Addendum 1, Exhibit 2 (R. 840) 
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2. Centennial Pointe is comprised of two integrated commercial buildings, sharing 
common areas which include, inter alia, utilities, grass areas and landscaping, walkways, 
interior roads, as well as parking spaces around the two various buildings. (R. 840) 
3. On or about April 18, 2000, Centennial Pointe's owner and developer, Centennial 
Pointe, LLC, executed Centennial Pointe's Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions ("April 2000 CC&Rs"), which were recorded by the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's office on April 19, 2000 as Entry No. 7631217. (R. 840); See Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. (R. 885) 
4. The April 2000 CC&Rs expressly granted Centennial Pointe, LLC, the declarant, 
the right to unilaterally amend the April 2000 CC&Rs and the Plat, so long as Centennial 
Pointe, LLC had not sold all of the Lots in Centennial Pointe. Specifically, 
Until the Declarant [Centennial Pointe, LLC] has sold all Lots, Declarant 
shall have the right unilaterally to amend and supplement this Declaration 
and the Plat to correct any technical errors or to clarify any provision to 
more fully express the intent of the Declarant for development and 
management of the Project. 
April 2000 CC&Rs, Section XIV(b). Addendum 1, Exhibit 2 (R. 907-08) 
5. The April 2000 CC&Rs provided for the establishment of an owners association 
(the "Association") to manage and maintain Centennial Pointe's common areas. (R. 893-
97) 
6. The Association was also vested with the authority to "fix, levy, collect and 
enforce payment" of all charges and assessments for, inter alia, the maintenance and 
repair of Centennial Pointe's common areas and for capital improvements, as well as to 
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impose fines and late fees for an owner's failure to pay his pr her assessments. (R. 897-
900,917-18) 
7. The April 2000 CC&Rs provided for the award of attorney fees and costs for the 
enforcement of the CC&Rs. (R. 896, 917-18) 
8. The April 2000 CC&Rs define the common areas to include all parking stalls, 
roads, walkways and landscaping. (R. 885-86, 905) 
9. However, the April 2000 CC&Rs contained some conflicting or overlapping 
definitions. For example, common areas were defined to exclude Lots, but the 
description of Lots in the CC&Rs and the Plat showed all of the property encompassed in 
Lots. Also, "Buildings" were defined to include landscaping as well as other 
improvements existing on a Lot. (R. 885-86) 
10. On or about April 24, 2000, Myriam Onyeabor purchased Lot 1 in the 
Centennial Pointe development. (R. 1039) 
11. To clarify the ambiguities and conflicting definitions contained in the April 
2000 CC&Rs, Centennial Pointe, LLC caused to be prepared Centennial Pointe's 
Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions ("Restated Amended 
CC&Rs"), which Centennial Pointe, LLC intended to supercede and amend the April 
2000 CC&Rs. See Affidavit of Donald Sanborn. Addendum 1, Exhibit 2; (R. 100-04) 
12. The Restated Amended CC&Rs did not alter the fee simple ownership interest 
that Centennial Pointe owners possessed over their Lots. (R. 1109) 
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13. The Restated Amended CC&Rs defined Centennial Pointe's Common 
Elements (or common areas) as "Utility Lines, lighting not attached to Buildings, fences, 
landscaping, Accessways, parking spaces, loading/receiving areas, and all other portions 
of [Centennial Pointe] other than the Buildings." (R. 1106) 
14. The Restated Amended CC&Rs continued to vest the Association with the 
authority to maintain and manage Centennial Pointe's common areas. (R. 1114) 
15. The Restated Amended CC&Rs continued to vest the Association with the 
authority to "fix, levy, collect and enforce payment" of all charges and assessments for, 
inter alia, the maintenance and repair of Centennial Pointe's common areas and for 
capital improvements. (R. 1115) 
16. The Restated Amended CC&Rs provide for the award of attorney fees and 
costs for the enforcement of the CC&Rs. (R. 1115, 1135-36) 
17. The Restated Amended CC&Rs continued to vest in the Association the 
authority to impose and collect fines and late fees for, inter alia, an owner's failure to pay 
his or her assessments. (R. 1135-36) 
18. The Restated Amended CC&Rs continued to grant Centennial Pointe's owners 
and the Association the right to use the common areas, as well as ingress and egress 
easements over those areas. (R. 1109-10) 
19. Donald Sanborn, the manager of Centennial Pointe, LLC, executed the 
Restated Amended CC&Rs on behalf of Centennial Pointe, LLC. (R. 1100-04) 
10 
20. On August 24, 2000, the Restated Amended CC&Rs were recorded by the Salt 
Lake County Recorder's Office as Entry No. 7704757. (R. 1106) 
21. On or about September 28, 2000, after the Restated Amended CC&Rs had been 
recorded, Ms. Onyeabor purchased Lot 2 in Centennial Pointe from Centennial Pointe, 
LLC. (R. 1040) 
22. Prior to closing, Ms. Onyeabor received title work, followed by a policy of title 
insurance for Lot 2 that expressly disclosed that Lot 2 was encumbered by the Restated 
Amended CC&Rs. Addendum 1, Exhibit 2; (R. 1058-59, 1192-93) 
23. The Special Warranty Deed from Centennial Pointe, LLC to Ms. Onyeabor for 
Lot 2 expressly states that Centennial Pointe, LLC's conveyance was subject to any 
restrictions of record. (R. 1039, 1203) 
24. In November, 2000, LEBR Associates, LLC ("LEBR") purchased Lots 3, 4, 
and 5 in the Centennial Pointe Development. (R. 1206) 
25. LEBR is a limited liability company. (R. 1206) 
26. LEBR's managing partner is Bruce Raile. (R. 1206) 
27. From April 2000 through December 2000, the Association maintained 
Centennial Pointe's common areas, including, but not limited to, the landscaping and 
snow removal in the Centennial Pointe development. Addendum 1, Exhibit 2 (R. 1017-
21,1103,1217-18) 
28. The Association also paid the water, sewer, power and insurance for the 
Centennial Pointe development. (R. 1217-18) 
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29. In December 2000, the Association assessed the Centennial Pointe owners, 
including Ms. Onyeabor, for their pro rata share of Centennial Pointe's common 
expenses for the period of April 2000 through December 2000. (R. 1016-18) 
30. Specifically, the Association assessed Ms. Onyeabor $1,028.42 for her pro rata 
share of the common expenses. Addendum 1, Exhibit 2 (R. 1017) 
31. The assessment included costs for landscaping, snow removal, water, sewer 
and power. (R. 1217-18) 
32. Ms. Onyeabor paid the $1,028.42 Association assessment. (R. 1017-18) 
33. Ms. Onyeabor did not contest the existence of the Association, nor its authority 
to assess Centennial Pointe owners for the maintenance and repair of Centennial Pointe's 
common areas and utilities in the Centennial Pointe development. (R. 1017-21) 
34. In December 2000, Bruce Raile was elected president of the Association and 
Ms. Onyeabor was elected secretary of the Association. (R. 1206, 1220-21) 
35. On October 2001, the Association conducted a meeting with all members of the 
Association, including Ms. Onyeabor, in attendance. (R. 1024, 1223) 
36. During that meeting, the Association members discussed the 2001 assessments 
for the maintenance of Centennial Pointe's common areas, including power, water, sewer, 
landscaping and insurance. (R. 1024, 1223) 
37. Ms. Onyeabor agreed to obtain bids for the Association maintaining the 
landscaping and snow removal for Centennial Pointe's common areas. (R. 1024-25, 
1223) 
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38. On or about November 26, 2001, Ms. Onyeabor paid the Association's 2001 
assessment in the amount of $2,745.00. (R. 1026-27) 
39. The assessment included expenses for water and sewer, power, insurance, and 
landscaping and snow removal. (R. 1225) 
40. Ms. Onyeabor paid the Association's assessments through October 2002. 
Addendum 1, Exhibit 2 (R. 1027-28, 1207) 
41. Ms. Onyeabor has testified that she received written notice of the amount of 
her ratable share of the common expenses in December 2000, November 2001, January 
2002, March 2002, and May 2002. (R. 1017, 1025, 1027-2^) 
42. Ms. Onyeabor willingly paid those assessments. (R. 1017, 1026, 1027-29) 
43. On or about May 22, 2002, Ms. Onyeabor notified the members of the 
Association that beginning June 1, 2002 she would no longer participate as a member of 
the Association or pay her pro rata share of Centennial Pointe's common expenses. (R. 
1011-12,1227) 
44. Ms. Onyeabor also informed the members of the Association that she, and not 
the Association, would maintain the landscaping and common area on or around her two 
Lots, and that she would have vehicles towed that were parked in the Centennial Pointe 
parking stalls within her purported "legal boundary." (R. 1011-12, 1227) 
45. In or about June 2002, after receipt of Ms. Onyeabor's letter, the Association's 
president Bruce Raile forwarded to Ms. Onyeabor a copy of a memorandum from Dave 
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Castleton, the Association's attorney, explaining that Ms. Onyeabor could not unilaterally 
opt out of her obligations as a Centennial Pointe owner. (R. 1206-07, 1229-32) 
46. After October 2002, Ms. Onyeabor ceased paying the Association's 
assessments, forcing the other Centennial Pointe owners to pay more than their ratable 
share of Centennial Pointe's expenses for joint utilities and maintenance of the common 
areas. (R. 1207) 
47. Ms. Onyeabor continued to receive assessment statements from the 
Association, but ignored those statements. (R. 1029, 1240-41) 
48. Ms. Onyeabor was provided an assessment statement in November 2004, 
February 2005, April 2005, May 2005, August 2005, September 2005, October 2005, 
November 2005, January 2006, March 2006, June 2006, and September 2006. (R. 1239, 
1241) 
49. Ms. Onyeabor ignored those statements. (R. 1240-41) 
50. Jennifer Clark is the secretary of the Association and either sent or caused to be 
sent statements and assessment information from the Association to Ms. Onyeabor. (R. 
1240-41) 
51. Ms. Clark is an employee of Sun Optics, which is located in Centennial Pointe. 
(R. 1240) 
52. Ms. Clark is not and has never been an employee of LEBR. (R. 1240, 1206) 
53. Ms. Onyeabor has asserted counterclaims against Plaintiffs and Third-Party 
Defendants. (R. 217-88, 715-40, 796-97) 
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54. On March 23, 2006, in her deposition, Ms. Onyeabor testified as follows: 
a.Ms. Onyeabor met Mr. Raile for the first time after she purchased Lot 2 and 
LEBR had purchased Lots 3, 4, and 5 in Centennial Pointe. See Exhibit 2 (R. 958) 
b. Ms. Onyeabor testified that she had never met Mr. Raile or had any discussions 
with him prior to LEBR's purchase of the Lots in Centennial Pointe. (R. 958) 
d. Ms. Onyeabor testified that nothing Mr. Raile said or did affected her decision 
to purchase Lots 1 and 2 in Centennial Pointe. (R. 959) 
e.Ms. Onyeabor testified that her complaint against Mr. Raile stems from Mr. 
Raile (1) "talk[ing] down to [her]," (2) telling Ms. Onyeabor that Centennial Pointe's 
parking area is a common area as defined by the CC&Rs, (3) telling Ms. Onyeabor that 
Mr. Raile's employees could park in any of Centennial Pointe's parking stalls, even those 
in front of Ms. Onyeabor's business, and (4) telling Ms. Onyeabor that the landscaped 
areas in Centennial Pointe, even those in and around Ms. Onyeabor's Lots, are common 
areas to be maintained by the Association. (R. 997-98) 
f. Ms. Onyeabor testified that Mr. Raile never came into her building during any 
of his conversations with Ms. Onyeabor. (R. 925) 
g. Ms. Onyeabor testified that Mr. Raile has never called her a derogatory name. 
(R. 926-27) 
h. Ms. Onyeabor testified that Mr. Raile has never threatened her. (R. 927) 
i. Ms. Onyeabor testified that Mr. Raile has never touched her. (R. 927) 
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j . Ms. Onyeabor testified that her conversations with Mr. Raile occurred in the 
Centennial Pointe parking lot or on the sidewalk area outside of Ms. Onyeabor's building. 
(R. 925) 
55. Ms. Onyeabor has not sought medical attention as a result of any of the conduct 
that she relies upon to establish her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. (R. 
953, 976) 
56. Ms. Onyeabor has not sought treatment from a psychiatrist or a psychologist as 
a result of the alleged conduct of Plaintiffs or Third-Party Defendants. (R. 951) 
57. Ms. Onyeabor was not prescribed any medications, nor did she take any 
prescribed medications as a result of the alleged conduct of Plaintiffs or Third-Party 
Defendants. (R. 976) Ms. Onyeabor has testified that she "didn't need to." (R. 976) 
58. Regarding any distress that she may have experienced, Ms. Onyeabor testified 
that she just "dealft] with it." (R. 953) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS REGARDING CROSS-APPEAL 
59- On May 3, 2007, the trial court issued a Minute Entry granting Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, awarding them their attorney fees, and granting 
their Motions to Strike. See Exhibit 5 (R. 1975-77) 
60. The trial court denied Plaintiffs' claim for late fees and fines imposed against 
Ms. Onyeabor. Id. 
61. On June 20, 2007, Plaintiffs filed an affidavit of attorney fees, which included 
redacted billing statements. Exhibit 3 (R. 2017-64) 
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62. On August 7, 2007, the trial court issued a Minute Entry stating that Plaintiffs' 
attorney fees were exorbitant and reduced the fee by 50%. See Exhibit 6 (R. 2396-98) 
63. On October 1, 2007 the trial court executed and entered the Order granting 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motions to Strike. (R. 2521-90) 
64. The Order reflected the 50% reduction of Plaintiffs' attorney fee award. (R. 
2529) 
65. On October 25, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Cross-Appeal. (R. 2789-
91) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
L MS. ONYEABOR'S BRIEF DOES NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS 
OFTHE RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE AND SHOULD BE 
STRICKEN IN ITS ENTIRETY. 
Ms. Onyeabor's Brief does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, is inadequately briefed, and improperly raises issues for the first 
time on appeal. Accordingly, Ms. Onyeabor's brief should be stricken in its entirety. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT STRUCK 
THE AFFIDAVITS OF MYRIAM ONYEABOR. ROBERT MILLS, TRAVIS 
HEALY. OR ALEXANDER UDEH. 
Ms. Onyeabor has failed to proffer any facts, admissible evidence, or supporting legal 
authority to support her claim that the trial court abused its discretion by striking her 
affidavits. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and case law show that 
inadmissible evidence cannot be considered on summary judgment, and that the rules of 
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civil procedure and evidence apply to pro se litigants. Further, Ms. Onyeabor raises this 
issue for the first time on appeal. Ms. Onyeabor's argument should be denied. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The trial court correctly granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The record shows that Ms. Onyeabor purchased her first lot, Lot 1, subject to the April 
2000 CC&Rs, which reserved unilateral amendment authority in Centennial Pointe's 
owner/developer, the owner/developer properly amended the April 2000 CC&Rs when it 
adopted the Restated Amended CC&Rs to clarify the April 2000 CC&Rs; and Ms. 
Onyeabor had notice of the Restated Amended CC&Rs before she purchased her second 
lot, Lot 2. The reservation of amendment authority in CC&Rs is enforceable, and 
Centennial Pointe's owner/developer satisfied the requirements necessary to exercise that 
authority. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that the Restated Amended 
CC&Rs are valid and encumber Ms. Onyeabor's Lots 1 and 2. Ms. Onyeabor has failed 
to proffer any facts, admissible evidence, or legal authority to show otherwise. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED MS. ONYEABOR'S 
COUNTERCLAIMS FOR QUIET TITLE AND DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT. 
Ms. Onyeabor's counterclaims for quiet title and declaratory judgment were premised 
on her claim that the Restated Amended CC&Rs were invalid. Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment put those claims at issue. When the trial court determined that 
the Restated Amended CC&Rs were valid, Ms. Onyeabor's claims necessarily failed as a 
matter of law. The trial court correctly dismissed these claims with prejudice. 
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V. - VI. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED MS. ONYEABOR'S 
CLAIMS FOR TRESPASS. ASSAULT, AND INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
Ms. Onyeabor has failed to proffer any facts or admissible evidence to overcome the 
undisputed facts and evidence proffered to the trial court that show Ms. Onyeabor failed 
to establish the required elements to sustain these claims as a matter of law. The trial 
court correctly dismissed these claims with prejudice. 
VII. MS. ONYEABOR'S CLAIM THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES FAILS. 
Ms. Onyeabor's argument is incomplete and inadequately briefed and should not be 
considered. The Restated Amended CC&Rs expressly provide an award of attorney fees 
for enforcing Centennial Pointe's CC&Rs. Ms. Onyeabor's argument fails. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REDUCING 
PLAINTIFFS' AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES BY AN ARBITRARY 50%. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it reduced Plaintiffs' award of attorney fees 
without analysis of the evidence supporting Plaintiffs' attorney fees, or addressing the 
factors set forth in Dixie State Bank. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's ruling and award Plaintiffs the attorney fees set forth in Plaintiffs' counsels' fee 
affidavit, or, alternatively, remand back to the trial court to analyze the evidence proffered 
under the factors set forth in Dixie State Bank. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR 
LATE FEES AND PENALTIES IMPOSED AGAINST MS. ONYEABOR 
PURSUANT TO THE RESTATED AMENDED CC&RS. 
19 
The trial court erred when it denied Plaintiffs' claim for late fees and fines imposed 
against Ms. Onyeabor under Centennial Pointe's CC&Rs, because the trial court 
concluded they were not damages as a result of Ms. Onyeabor's breach of the CC&Rs. 
Restrictive covenants are interpreted in the same manner as contracts and should be 
enforced as written. The Restated Amended CC&Rs expressly provide for late fees and 
fines for failure to pay assessments and for violating the CC&Rs. The late fees and fines 
are a contractual remedy. The undisputed facts and evidence show that Ms. Onyeabor has 
failed and refused to pay her assessments and violated the Restated Amended CC&Rs. 
Plaintiffs have been damaged by Ms. Onyeabor's conduct. Accordingly, the trial court 
erred when it refused to award Plaintiffs the late fees and fines as provided for under the 
Restated Amended CC&Rs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MS. ONYEABOR'S BRIEF DOES NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS 
OFTHE RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE AND SHOULD BE 
STRICKEN IN ITS ENTIRETY. 
Ms. Onyeabor's brief is difficult to comprehend, confusingly organized, difficult to 
respond to, and does not conform to the rules of appellate procedure. Ms. Onyeabor's 
statement of issues lacks citation to the record or standards of review. See Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(5). This failure to cite to the record is pervasive throughout Ms. Onyeabor's 
Brief. Ms. Onyeabor's Statement of Facts contains unsupported allegations, inadmissible 
evidence, as well as inadmissible evidence not before the trial court on summary 
judgment, and improper argument. See e.g., Onyeabor Brief at 15 1fl[ 2, 4; 17 ^  10, 11, 
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12; 18118; 19 K 20; 20 ^[23; 21 ^ 26. Ms. Onyeabor's arguments are incomplete, not 
coherently organized, conclusory, rely on inadmissible evidence and lack supporting legal 
authority. See e.g., Onyeabor Brief at 27-28 (affidavits), 47-48 (affidavits and referenced 
exhibits), 50 (incomplete argument), 56 (incomplete argument). Ms. Onyeabor has 
inadequately briefed the issues and arguments contained in her Brief, and her Brief should 
be stricken. See Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also 
Utah R. App. P. 24(k). "[N]either an opposing party, nor the appellate courts, are obliged 
to address deficiencies in an appellant's briefing." Department of Human Serv. v. 
Schwarz, 2003 UT App 406, *2, - P.3d- (Memorandum Decision) (citing Smith v. Smith, 
1999 UT App 370, % 8, 995 P.2d 14)). 
Ms. Onyeabor asserts several new issues for the first time on appeal with no citation to 
the record. See e.g. Onyeabor Brief, Section II due process, constructive fraud (Ms. 
Onyeabor has no claim for constructive fraud); page 31 (the Plat violates criminal law); 
page 37 ("stranger to the deed" arguments); pages 42 and 50 (notice and standing); and 
page 52 (restated Amended CC&Rs are ambiguous). These issues and arguments should 
not be considered. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah Ct. App 1987). Ms. 
Onyeabor's Brief is fatally deficient and should be stricken in its entirety. Alternatively, 
this Court should not consider the issues, arguments, facts, or evidence not properly 
before this Court. Finally, Plaintiffs' request that this Court award them their attorney 
fees and costs on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(k), see also Plaintiffs' Opposition to 
Ms. Onyeabor's Motion for Summary Disposition, dated February 2, 2008. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT STRUCK 
THE AFFIDAVITS OF MYRIAM ONYEABOR, ROBERT MILLS. TRAVIS 
HEALY. OR ALEXANDER UDEH. 
The trial court properly struck the affidavits of Myriam Onyeabor, Robert Mills, 
Travis Healy, and Alexander Udeh proffered in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. As set forth in Plaintiffs' Motions to Strike, which 
specifically addressed the deficient paragraphs in each affidavit, those affidavits did not 
satisfy Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or the Utah Rules of Evidence, as 
this lacked foundation, contained inadmissible hearsay, and were conclusory and 
argumentative. See Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike; see e.g., Exhibit 3 (R. 1587-1616, 1620-
48, 1649-1709) Ms. Onyeabor did not and has not addressed these legal deficiencies, nor 
has she pointed out in her Brief a single paragraph in any of the affidavits that was 
purportedly improperly stricken. Ms. Onyeabor has not shown that the trial court abused 
its discretion by striking the affidavits. 
For the first time on appeal Ms. Onyeabor argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by striking the affidavits because she is a pro se litigant. This Court should 
refuse to consider this argument. See James, 746 P.2d at 801. That said, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion. This Court reviews a trial court's decision to strike affidavits 
"under a broad grant of discretion." Murdoch v. Springfield Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, % 
25, 982 P.2d 65 (citation omitted). It is well-settled that inadmissible evidence may not 
be considered on summary judgment. See Panos v. Olsen & Assocs. Const., Inc., 2005 
UT App 446, U 6, 123 P.3d 816. A pro se litigant must set forth admissible evidence 
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pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Winter v. Northwest 
Pipeline Corp., 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991). These well-settled legal standards make 
it clear that Ms. Onyeabor's argument fails. Moreover, Ms. Onyeabor has cited no 
authority to show that a trial court abuses its discretion by refusing to accept inadmissible 
evidence from a pro se litigant. Ms. Onyeabor's argument fails. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The trial court correctly granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The undisputed facts and evidence proffered by Plaintiffs, as well as an abundance of 
legal authority cited by Plaintiffs, show that the trial court correctly determined that, inter 
alia, Ms. Onyeabor purchased Lot 1 subject to the April 2000 CC&Rs; Centennial 
Pointe's owner and developer, Centennial Pointe LLC, had the reserved unilateral 
authority, under the April 2000 CC&Rs, to amend the April 2000 CC&Rs; the Restated 
Amended CC&Rs were validly adopted and amended and superceded the April 2000 
CC&Rs; Ms. Onyeabor had notice of the Restated Amended CC&Rs before she 
purchased Lot 2; and that the Restated Amended CC&Rs encumber Ms. Onyeabor's Lots 
1 and 2 in Centennial Pointe. (R. 2521-90) The trial court's determination that the 
Restated Amended CC&Rs were valid and encumbered Ms. Onyeabor's property 
properly disposed of Ms. Onyeabor's counterclaims for quiet title and declaratory 
judgment, which were based upon Ms. Onyeabor's claim that Restated Amended CC&Rs 
were invalid. (R. 730-32) 
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This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for correctness. 
See Traco, 2007 UT App 407 at % 31. Summary judgment is appropriate "when there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." Mountain West Surgical Ctr., LLC v. Hospital Corp. of Utah, 2007 UT 92,1f 10, 
173 P.3d 1276; Utah R. Civ. P. 56. Conclusory allegations and denials are insufficient to 
raise an issue of material fact in opposition to summary judgment, as statements that are 
not admissible in evidence may not be considered on summary judgment. Panos v. Olsen 
andAssocs. Const. Inc., 2005 UT App 446, \ 6, 123 P.3d 816, rehearing denied. A party 
opposing summary judgment has a duty to set forth specific facts showing there is a 
genuine issue for trial. DCB Collection Trust by Helgesen & Waterfall v. Harris, 893 
P.2d 593, 597 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), cert, denied, 910 P.2d 425. 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that a "memorandum opposing 
a motion for summary judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the 
moving party's facts that is controverted, and that for each fact controverted, the opposing 
party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to 
relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
7(c)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is 
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the 
responding party." Id. Rule 7(c)(3)(A). 
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A. The Trial Court Correctly Determined That There Were No Disputed Issues of 
Fact. 
The record shows that Ms. Onyeabor did not controvert, or dispute any of the facts set 
forth in Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 1306-44) The affidavits 
Ms. Onyeabor proffered in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion were not admissible evidence 
and were properly stricken. See Section II, supra. Ms. Onyeabor's Opposition 
Memorandum contained a section entitled "Statements (Motion in Opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment)." (R. 1316). In that section, Ms. Onyeabor made a number of 
conclusory statements. Those statements were not admissible evidence, were conclusory, 
and were largely improper argument, e.g., "That the August CC&r [sic] has failed all 
legal tests." (R. 1317) Ms. Onyeabor's "Statements" did not address or proffer 
admissible evidence in opposition to the facts set forth in Plaintiffs' Motion that show, 
inter alia, that the Restated Amended CC&Rs are valid and encumber Ms. Onyeabor's 
property as a matter of law. As such, the facts in Plaintiffs' Motion are undisputed and 
the trial court correctly determined that there were no genuine or disputed issues of 
material fact. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A), (B); Panos, 2005 UT App 446 at U 6; DCB 
Collection, 893 P.2d at 597. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Determined That the Restated Amended CC&Rs 
Were Validly Adopted Under the Provisions of the April 2000 CC&Rs. 
The Restated Amended CC&Rs were validly adopted and those CC&Rs amended and 
superceded the April 2000 CC&Rs. Ms. Onyeabor has failed to proffer any facts, 
evidence or legal authority to show otherwise. Centennial Pointe's owner and developer, 
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Centennial Pointe LLC, had the reserved right to unilaterally amend the April 2000 
CC&Rs. (R. 840, 908) Specifically, 
Until the Declarant [Centennial Pointe] has sold all Lots, Declarant shall 
have the right unilaterally to amend and supplement this Declaration and the 
Plat to correct any technical error or to clarify any provision more fully to 
express the intent of the Declarant for development and management of 
[Centennial Pointe]. 
April 2000 CC&Rs, Section XIV(b). Exhibit 2; (R. 908) Ms. Onyeabor purchased Lot 1 
in Centennial Pointe after the April 2000 CC&Rs were recorded. (R. 840-41) As such, 
Ms. Onyeabor purchased Lot 1 subject to the April 2000 CC&Rs, "which clearly included 
an express right of alteration or amendment." Baldwin v. Barbon Corp., 113 S.W.2d 681, 
686 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); see also (R. 854) 
Provisions reserving a developer's right to unilaterally amend restrictive covenants are 
enforceable. See e.g. The View Condo Owner's Assoc, v. MSICO, LLC, 2005 UT 91, f 
26, 127 P.3d 697 (acknowledging that CC&Rs provided developer the unilateral right to 
amend CC&Rs, but developer failed to follow the procedures set forth in CC&Rs to 
implement unilateral amendment); see also Baldwin v. Barbon Corp., 773 S.W.2d 681, 
686 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Rossman v. The Seasons at Tiara Rado Assocs., 943 P.2d 34 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1997) {upholding developer's right to unilaterally amend CC&Rs where 
amendment did not did not destroy the general scheme or plan of development for the 
neighborhood); Flamingo Ranch Estates, Inc. v. Sunshine Ranches Homeowners, Inc., 
303 So.2d 665, 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (same). The factors to be considered when 
analyzing such provisions are (1) the "instrument creating the original restrictions must 
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establish both the right to amend such restrictions and the method of amendment"; (2) the 
"right to amend such restrictions implies only those changes contemplating a correction, 
improvement, or reformation of the agreement rather than a complete destruction of it"; 
and (3) "the amendment to the restrictions may not be illegal or against public policy." 
Baldwin, 113 S.W.2d at 685; see also (R. 854-59) Ms. Onyeabor has not proffered any 
legal authority to show that such provisions were unenforceable. 
The April 2000 CC&Rs provided a right to, and a method for, Centennial Pointe LLC 
to unilaterally amend the April 2000 CC&Rs. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 4-5. (R. 
856-57) At the time Centennial Pointe LLC executed and recorded the Restated 
Amended CC&Rs, Centennial Pointe LLC had not sold all of the Lots in the Centennial 
Pointe development. (R. 843-44) As such, the first requirement was satisfied. See 
Baldwin, 113 S.W.2d at 685. Further, Centennial Pointe LLC executed and recorded the 
Restated Amended CC&Rs thus satisfying the "method" for amendment. Id. 
The Restated Amended CC&Rs clarified ambiguities and overlap in the April 2000 
CC&Rs regarding the common areas. Specifically, Centennial Pointe is a PUD. (R. 888) 
The April 2000 CC&Rs defined common areas to include landscaping, walkways, 
parking spaces and roads. Exhibit 2; (R. 885-86) The April 2000 CC&Rs provided that 
all Centennial Pointe property owners had the right to use the common areas and had 
reciprocal easements over the common areas. (R. 889) The April 2000 CC&Rs also 
provided that the Association was responsible for maintaining and managing the common 
areas. (R. 895) However, plainly contrary to those definitions and terms, as well as 
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Centennial Pointe, LLC's intent that Centennial Pointe be a PUD, the April 2000 CC&Rs 
defined common areas to exclude "Lots." (R. 885) The April 2000 CC&Rs defined 
"Buildings" to include "landscaping" "and other improvements of any kind existing on a 
Lot at anytime." (R. 885) These definitions created ambiguities because the definitions 
of Lots, Buildings and common areas overlapped in some respects. 
Undisputed evidence proffered to the trial court showed that Centennial Pointe LLC 
adopted the Restated Amended CC&Rs to more clearly define Centennial Pointe's 
common areas to include, inter alia, "landscaping, Accessways, parking spaces, 
loading/receiving areas and all other portions of [Centennial Pointe] other than 
"Buildings." (R. 858); Affidavit of Donald Sanborn. (R. 1102) These were the same 
common areas identified in the April 2000 CC&Rs. The undisputed facts and evidence 
presented to the trial court showed that the Restated Amended CC&Rs did not alter 
Centennial Pointe's owners' ownership interest in their Lots, they continued to have fee 
simple ownership. Compare April 2000 CC&Rs Section IV, 4.1 (R. 889); Restated 
Amended CC&Rs Section IV, 4.1. Exhibit 2 (R. 1109) The Restated Amended CC&Rs 
did not change Centennial Pointe's owners right to access and use the common areas. 
Compare April 2000 CC&Rs, Section IV, 4.6, 4.7 (R. 889), Restated Amended CC&Rs, 
Section IV, 4.5, 4.6. (R. 1109-10). The Restated Amended CC&Rs did not destroy the 
general scheme or development plan of Centennial Pointe; it was and continues to be a 
PUD. See Baldwin, 113 S.W.2d at 685; see also Rossman v. The Seasons at Tiara Rado 
Assocs., 943 P.2d 34 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) {upholding developer's right to unilaterally 
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amend CC&Rs where amendment did not did not destroy the general scheme or plan of 
development for the neighborhood); Flamingo Ranch Estates, Inc. v. Sunshine Ranches 
Homeowners, Inc., 303 So.2d 665, 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974 (same). The Restated 
Amended CC&Rs improved the Centennial Pointe development, clarified the ambiguities 
in the April 2000 CC&Rs, and the amendment was neither illegal nor against public 
policy. See Baldwin, 113 S.W.2d at 685. The record shows the trial court correctly 
determined that the Restated Amended CC&Rs were validly adopted. 
On appeal, Ms. Onyeabor argues otherwise. See Onyeabor Brief at 39. Ms. Onyeabor 
argues that the April 2000 CC&Rs required the written approval of 67% of the first 
mortgagees before Centennial Pointe LLC could amend the April 2000 CC&Rs. See id. 
at 40. Ms. Onyeabor's argument fails. The provision Ms. Onyeabor relies upon in the 
April 2000 CC&Rs affects only the Association's authority to act. Specifically, "Unless 
at least 67% (based upon one vote for each mortgage) of the individual Lots subject to 
first mortgage consent in writing, the Association shall not be entitled, by act, omission, 
or otherwise... ." April 2000 CC&Rs Section XIII, 13.5 (emphasis added). (R.906) The 
provision relied upon by Ms. Onyeabor places no limitation on Centennial Pointe LLC, 
the owner/developer, which had a reserved express right to unilaterally amend the April 
2000 CC&Rs. Ms. Onyeabor took Lot 1, her first purchase in the development, subject to 
Centennial Pointe LLC's reserved amendment right. Baldwin, 113 S.W.2d at 685. The 
provision Ms. Onyeabor relies upon is inapplicable and her argument fails. 
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Next, Ms. Onyeabor argues that a vote of Owners holding at least 67% of the 
"Percentage Interests" was required for Centennial Pointe LLC to amend the Declaration. 
See Onyeabor Brief at 41. Ms. Onyeabor relies upon Section XIV of the April 2000 
CC&Rs. See id. However, Section XIV expressly provides exceptions to requiring such 
a vote. (R. 907) One key exception is where the Declarant, Centennial Pointe LLC, 
exercises its unilateral right to amend the April 2000 CC&Rs, which is what occurred. 
(R. 908) The express language of the April 2000 CC&Rs shows that no vote of the 
Owners was required for Centennial Pointe, LLC to exercise its reserved unilateral 
amendment authority. Accordingly, Ms. Onyeabor's argument fails. 
Finally, Ms. Onyeabor argues that a new plat needed to be filed for the Restated 
Amended CC&Rs to be valid. See Onyeabor Brief at 40. Ms. Onyeabor provides no 
legal authority to support her conclusory argument, but merely relies upon her reading of 
the Restated Amended CC&Rs. See id. Conclusory allegations or denials are insufficient 
to oppose summary judgment. See Panos, 2005 UT App 446 at |^ 6. The undisputed facts 
and evidence in this matter show that Centennial Pointe L.C.'s amendment of the April 
2000 CC&Rs did not alter the Plat. Ms. Onyeabor has failed to proffer any facts, 
admissible evidence or legal authority to show that the Plat has changed. The Restated 
Amended CC&Rs merely clarify the ambiguities in the April 2000 CC&Rs regarding the 
definition of "buildings" and "Lots," and furthered the intent of Centennial Pointe, LLC 
and the original CC&Rs that the parking lot, parking stalls, roads, landscaped areas and 
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sidewalks located in Centennial Pointe be common areas, and that all Centennial Pointe 
owners, tenants and invitees have a reciprocal easement over these common areas. 
Neither the size of the Lots nor the building sizes were altered, and Ms. Onyeabor did not 
and has not presented any facts or admissible evidence to show they were. (R. 920, 1137) 
Ms. Onyeabor's conclusory and unsupported argument fails. The record shows that the 
trial court correctly ruled that the Restated Amended CC&Rs were validly adopted. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded That Ms. Onyeabor Had Notice of the 
Restated Amended CC&Rs. 
The record shows that Ms. Onyeabor had notice of the Restated Amended CC&Rs 
before she purchased Lot 2. Before she purchased Lot 2, Ms. Onyeabor received a title 
insurance commitment that disclosed the Restated Amended CC&Rs. Exhibit 2 (R. 843-
44, 864, 1062-63, 1192, 1196) Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that Ms. 
Onyeabor had notice of the Restated Amended CC&Rs before she purchased Lot 2. 
On appeal, Ms. Onyeabor argues that the "content of the Restated Amended CC&Rs 
were not disclosed" to her. See Onyeabor Brief at 26. She relies upon inadmissible 
evidence to support her argument, specifically, the affidavits of two realtors.2 See id. at 
27. Ms. Onyeabor argues that these two realtors had a duty to inform her of the Restated 
Amended CC&Rs, but failed to do so. See id. This conclusory argument does not 
2The affidavits cited in her Brief at 27 are not the affidavits she proffered in 
opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Those affidavits are 
located in the record at 1346-56. 
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overcome the undisputed facts or evidence that Ms. Onyeabor had notice of the Restated 
Amended CC&Rs before she purchased Lot 2. Ms. Onyeabor 's argument fails. 
Ms. Onyeabor attempts to bootstrap revival of her fraud claim against LEBR and the 
Association with her notice argument. See id. at 26, 30-31. Ms. Onyeabor asserted a 
fraud claim against Plaintiff LEBR and the Association based entirely on a purported 
misrepresentation by these parties. (R. 732-33) Plaintiffs responded to Ms. Onyeabor's 
fraud claim, proffering undisputed facts and evidence to the trial court showing that no 
misrepresentation had been made, e.g., no representative of LEBR or Bruce Raile, the 
Association's president, had any communication with Ms. Onyeabor until after she 
purchased Lot 2 (R. 958-59), and neither influenced her decision in any way to purchase 
her property in Centennial Pointe. (R. 958-59) The trial court correctly determined that 
Ms. Onyeabor had not satisfied the nine elements required to show fraud and correctly 
dismissed her fraud claim with prejudice. 
Now, Ms. Onyeabor argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred 
because it did not consider constructive fraud or fraudulent nondisclosure. See Onyeabor 
Brief at 26. Ms. Onyeabor does not have a claim for constructive fraud or fraudulent 
nondisclosure. (R. 732-33) Ms. Onyeabor's fraud claim was predicated on a 
misrepresentation. (R. 732-33) This Court should refuse to consider this argument. See 
James, 746 P.2d at 801. That said, Ms. Onyeabor has failed to proffer any facts, evidence 
or legal authority to show that either LEBR, which was not a property owner at the time 
Ms. Onyeabor purchased Lot 2, or the Association had a legal duty to communicate to 
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Ms. Onyeabor regarding the existence of the Restated Amended CC&Rs. See Onyeabor 
Brief at 26, 30-31. Neither LEBR nor the Association sold Ms. Onyeabor Lot 2. (R. 843) 
Further, Ms. Onyeabor had notice of the Restated Amended CC&Rs before she purchased 
Lot 2. (R. 1058-59, 1192-93) Ms. Onyeabor's argument fails. 
D. The Trial Court Correctly Determined That the Restated Amended CC&Rs Are 
Valid and Encumber Ms. Onyeabor's Property. 
The trial court correctly determined that the Restated Amended CC&Rs are valid, 
including the assessment authority, and that they encumber Ms. Onyeabor's property. 
Ms. Onyeabor argues that the Restated Amended CC&Rs are invalid because the Plat 
purportedly does not show the easements, parking stalls, or common areas. See Onyeabor 
Brief at 33. Ms. Onyeabor did not provide the trial court with an affidavit or expert 
testimony regarding what easements, etc. are reflected thereon. In fact, a layman's review 
of the Plat reveals that there must be easements, otherwise the interior lots are landlocked 
with no access to a public street or their loading docks along the interior driveway 
separating the two buildings. See Onyeabor Brief, Exhibit 1. The Restated Amended 
CC&Rs did not change the size of the Lots or buildings. (R. 920, 1137) Moreover, Ms. 
Onyeabor did not proffer any evidence or any legal authority to the trial court to show that 
an amended plat needed to be recorded for the Restated Amended CC&Rs to be valid, or 
that the Plat somehow controlled over the Restated Amended CC&Rs and the easements 
and common areas identified therein. 
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To support her argument, Ms. Onyeabor has cited and cites to both state statutes and 
municipal ordinances. See id. at 32-34. Ms. Onyeabor relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 57-
8-1, et. seq., the Condominium Act. See id. at 29. The Centennial Pointe development is 
not a condominium, but rather a PUD. (R. 840) That said, the Condominium Act 
regarding this issue is highly informative. The Condominium Act does not require a plat 
to show "the location and dimensions of all easements appurtenant to the land included 
within the project." Id. § 57-8-13(vi). The Act states that easements be identified when 
"feasible." Id. Further, the Act provides that the recorded declaration include a 
description of the common areas and facilities, and a description of any limited common 
areas and facilities and the units that have use of these limited areas. Id. § 57-8-
10(2)(a)(iv)-(v) (emphasis added). The plat is not required to show the easements or 
common areas to be valid. This makes sense due to the substantial number of reciprocal 
easements that such a development would have. The result is no different with 
Centennial Pointe. 
Ms. Onyeabor also relies on Title 10 of the Utah Code, as well as provisions of the 
Salt Lake City Ordinances. See Onyeabor Brief at 29, 33. Neither of these support her 
argument. Title 10 of the Utah Code Annotated, includes subdivisions and plat 
requirements. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9a-601, -603. The Salt Lake City ordinance 
concerning subdivisions was enacted pursuant to Title 10 of the Utah Code. See Salt 
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Lake City Code § 20.04.020. Neither section requires that common areas be included on 
a plat for it to be valid. 
Further, the City ordinance provides that whenever any words are not defined in the 
subdivision title, but are defined in the Utah Code or City zoning ordinances, those 
definitions are incorporated into the subdivision title and shall apply, unless the definition 
"clearly" indicates a contrary contention. See Salt Lake City Code § 20.08.010. The 
City's subdivision ordinance does not define "easement." See id. Subdivisions, Title 20. 
The Utah Code Annotated expressly provides that "whenever any land is laid out and 
platted, the owner of the land shall provide an accurate plat that describes or specifies:... 
(d) every existing right-of-way and easement grant of record for underground facilities, 
as defined in Section 54-8a-2, and for other utility facilities." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-
603 (emphasis added). The Restatement of Property (Servitudes) further evidences that 
easements and common areas are not required to be shown on a plat. Comment c states 
that "[t]ypically, the servitudes are set out in a separate document, often labeled a 
declaration," which is recorded. Restatement (Third) of Prop. Servitudes, § 2.1 Comment 
c. Ms. Onyeabor has failed to proffer any facts, admissible evidence or legal authority to 
show that the Plat is invalid or that the Restated Amended CC&Rs are invalid. Ms. 
Onyeabor's arguments should be denied. 
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E. Ms. Onyeabor's Arguments Regarding the Validity of the Easements Provided 
by the Restated Amended CC&Rs Should Not Be Considered by This Court 
and Nevertheless Fail. 
The easements provided for in the Restated Amended CC&Rs are valid. On appeal, 
Ms. Onyeabor argues that the deeds she received conveying to her Lots 1 and 2 did not 
convey to the Association the easements provided for in the April 2000 CC&Rs, or the 
Restated Amended CC&Rs. See Onyeabor Brief at 34. Ms. Onyeabor's conclusory 
argument is difficult to decipher and should be denied. Ms. Onyeabor has inadequately 
briefed this argument, it is confusingly organized, and incomplete. See Phillips, 904 P.2d 
at 1109 (inadequate briefing). Further, this argument is raised for the first time on appeal. 
See James, 746 P.2d at 801. Ms. Onyeabor does not cite where she preserved this 
argument below. See Utah R. App. P. 24. Accordingly, for those reasons, this Court 
should refuse to consider this argument. 
That said, Ms. Onyeabor's argument fails. Ms. Onyeabor relies on the "stranger to the 
deed" doctrine to support her argument. See id. at 37. Ms. Onyeabor misapplies the 
doctrine. The stranger to the deed doctrine prevents reservation of an easement in favor 
of a third party (stranger) who was not a party to the transaction in a deed between a 
grantor and a grantee. See Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, ^ fij 12-13, 977 P.2d 533. 
The stranger to the deed doctrine does not prevent the creation of an easement in favor of 
a person granting rights over the grantor's property, and it does not prevent the 
conveyance of any subsequent conveyance of the grantor's property to a grantee made 
subject to a previously granted easement. See id. That is what happened in this case. 
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Centennial Pointe, LLC, owner and developer of Centennial Pointe, granted an easement 
to the Association when it recorded the April, 2000 CC&Rs. When Centennial Pointe 
LLC subsequently conveyed Lot 1 to Ms. Onyeabor, it did so subject to the April 2000 
CC&Rs which granted that easement. See Onyeabor Brief, Exhibit 4. Thus, the deed 
from Centennial Pointe, LLC to Ms. Onyeabor did not reserve an easement in favor of a 
third party when it conveyed Lot 1 to Ms. Onyeabor. The stranger to the deed argument 
presented by Ms. Onyeabor is inapposite to the facts of this matter. 
Ms. Onyeabor appears to make a similar "stranger to the deed" argument concerning 
the April 2000 CC&Rs. See Onyeabor Brief at 38. Centennial Pointe LLC validly 
encumbered Lot 1 by executing or recording the April 2000 CC&Rs. Ms. Onyeabor 
purchased Lot 1 subject to the April 2000 CC&Rs and the easements and restrictions 
provided therein, including Centennial Pointe LLC's reserved amendment authority. Ms. 
Onyeabor's argument makes little sense. Her argument should not be considered, but 
nevertheless fails. 
F. Ms. Onyeabor's Arguments That She Did Not Receive Notice of the 
Assessments and No Properly Filed Lien Was Subject to Judicial Foreclosure 
Should Not Be Considered and Stricken. 
Ms. Onyeabor's arguments on pages 42-45 were not raised to the trial court in her 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and should not be 
considered on appeal. See James, 446 P.2d at 801. Ms. Onyeabor fails to proffer any 
admissible evidence to support her arguments, or any citations to the record. See e.g. 
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Onyeabor Brief at 44-45. As such, this Court should refuse to consider them. See 
Phillips, 904 P.2d at 1109; Utah R. App. P. 24. 
Ms. Onyeabor claims she did not receive notice of the assessments. See Onyeabor 
Brief at 42. The undisputed facts of this matter show that Ms. Onyeabor received notice 
regarding assessments for her ratable share of the common expenses. The Restated 
Amended CC&Rs expressly state that "Assessments shall be due and payable within 30 
days after written notice of the amount thereof shall have been given to the Owners." (R. 
1117) Ms. Onyeabor has testified that she received written notice of the amount of her 
ratable share of the common expenses in December 2000, November 2001, January 2002, 
March 2002, and May 2002. (R. 1017, 1025, 1027-29) Ms. Onyeabor willingly paid 
those assessments. (R. 1017, 1026, 1027-29) At a minimum, Ms. Onyeabor's conduct 
shows that she has ratified the assessment procedure adopted by the Association, its 
predecessor, and the owners. See Swan Creek VilL Homeowners Assoc, v. Warne, 2006 
UT 22, f 32, 134 P.3d 1122 (owners ratified owners association's authority to act). 
Ms. Onyeabor also testified that she received written notice of the amount of her 
ratable share of the common expenses in January 2003 and thereafter. (R. 1028-29) Ms. 
Onyeabor testified that she ignored those written notices. (R. 1029) The facts and 
undisputed evidence show that Ms. Onyeabor was provided an assessment statement in 
November 2004, February 2005, April 2005, May 2005, August 2005, September 2005, 
October 2005, November 2005, January 2006, March 2006, June 2006, and September 
2006. (R. 1239, 1241) Ms. Onyeabor's notice argument fails. 
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Next, Ms. Onyeabor argues that the lien against Lots 1 and 2 is invalid. This Court 
should strike this argument as it raised for the first time on appeal and lacks citation to the 
record. See James, 746 P.2d at 801; Utah R. App. P. 24. Ms. Onyeabor bases her 
argument in part on lack of notice of the assessments. Ms. Onyeabor's notice argument 
fails. See supra. Ms. Onyeabor's challenge to the validity of the Association's lien 
against her property is a red herring. Plaintiffs asserted a breach of contract claim against 
Ms. Onyeabor for failure to pay her assessments. This Court has granted summary 
judgment on that claim and the Court has certified its Order granting summary judgment 
as a final judgment. The Association has been awarded damages in the amount of past 
due assessments and interest, and attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs have executed on the 
judgment not by foreclosing the lien recorded against Ms. Onyeabor's property, but rather 
by executing on Ms. Onyeabor's property via writs of execution to collect the judgment. 
See e.g., (R. 2654-57) As such, Plaintiffs have executed upon their judgment lien. The 
Restated Amended CC&Rs expressly provide that foreclosing a lien for failure to pay 
common assessment is not required to pursue a suit to recover a money judgment against 
an owner for failing to pay his or her assessments. (R. 1118) Accordingly, Ms. 
Onyeabor's challenge to the lien for assessments is immaterial to this Court's jurisdiction 
and Ms. Onyeabor's argument fails. 
G. The Undisputed Facts and Evidence in This Matter Show That Ms. Onyeabor 
Ratified the Restated Amended CC&Rs. 
Ms. Onyeabor has ratified the Restated Amended CC&Rs, including assessment 
authority, through her conduct. Specifically, Ms. Onyeabor paid her Centennial Pointe 
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assessments for a number of years after the recording of the Restated Amended CC&Rs. 
(R. 845, 1018) Ms. Onyeabor paid her assessments to the Association in 2000, 2001, and 
2002, which assessments included water, power, sewer, landscaping and snow removal 
expenses. (R. 845, 1020, 1025-27) Ms. Onyeabor paid her assessments until such time as 
she unilaterally decided to "ignore[]" the assessment statements from the Association. 
(R. 845, 1028) Ms. Onyeabor attended Association meetings, was elected as an officer of 
the Association, and agreed to assist the Association in obtaining a bid for the 
maintenance of the landscaped common areas. (R. 845-46, 1023-25) This conduct, 
pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Swan Creek, wherein the court used its 
equitable powers to hold that a property owner's and other owners conduct ratified an 
owners association's assessment and managerial authority3, shows that Ms. Onyeabor 
ratified the Restated Amended CC&Rs and that the trial court correctly ruled the same. 
On appeal, Ms. Onyeabor argues that she did not ratify the Restated Amended 
CC&Rs. See Onyeabor Brief at 45-50. Ms. Onyeabor's arguments are based upon her 
incorrect assertion that the Restated Amended CC&Rs are invalid, which Plaintiffs' have 
previously addressed. Ms. Onyeabor relies upon inadmissible evidence and pleadings 
outside the scope of her appeal to support her argument. See Onyeabor Brief at 46, 48. 
The affidavits relied upon by Ms. Onyeabor were not proffered in opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. These affidavits should not be considered, nor 
should the exhibits referenced on page 48. (R. 2151-58). 
3See Swan Creek, 2006 UT 22 at fflj 32, 38-39. 
40 
Ms. Onyeabor's mention of a "February 2002 agreement" was not raised in her 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Ms. Onyeabor has not 
produced any such agreement. To amend the Restated Amended CC&Rs such document 
needed to be recorded, and since all Lots in Centennial Pointe had been sold, the 
Association needed to execute the amending instrument, and the written consent of 67% 
of the first mortgagees for the Lots must have been obtained. (R. 1125-26). Ms. 
Onyeabor has not proffered any such evidence. Ms. Onyeabor's argument should be 
stricken and not considered. Finally, Ms. Onyeabor attempts to distinguish Swan Creek 
from this matter. See Swan Creek VilL Homeowners Assoc, v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, 134 
P.3d 1122; see Onyeabor Brief at 49-50. Ms. Onyeabor's argument is inadequately 
briefed and incomplete. This argument should be stricken and not considered. See 
Phillips, 904 P.2d at 1109. In sum, the trial court correctly determined that Ms. Onyeabor 
ratified the Restated Amended CC&Rs, including the assessment authority provided 
therein. 
H. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Bring Claims Against Ms. Onyeabor to Enforce the 
Restated Amended CC&Rs, Including Collection of Assessments. 
Ms. Onyeabor argues that Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring their claims against 
her. Ms. Onyeabor raises this argument for the first time on appeal and without any 
citation to the record. The Court should refuse to consider it. See James, 746 P.2d at 
801. Further, Ms. Onyeabor attempts to support her argument by merely reasserting her 
prior arguments, specifically, that the Restated Amended CC&Rs are invalid, the 
"stranger to the deed" doctrine, and invalid Plat. Plaintiffs have addressed these prior 
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arguments and have shown that they fail and should be denied. Ms. Onyeabor's standing 
argument fails. 
Plaintiffs plainly have standing to bring claims against Ms. Onyeabor to enforce the 
Restated Amended CC&Rs. Plaintiff LEBR is an owner in Centennial Pointe. (R. 844) 
The Restated Amended CC&Rs provide that an "aggrieved Owner" may bring suit to, 
inter alia, enforce the Restated Amended CC&Rs and to collect sums due. (R. 1134) 
The Association also has the right to enforce the Restated Amended CC&Rs. (R. 1134-
36) 
Moreover, the Association has standing to sue to enforce the Restated Amended 
CC&Rs under well-established principles of Utah law. In Architectural Comm, of the Mt. 
Olympus Cove Subdivision No. 3 v. Kabatznick, 949 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), 
this Court held that an association has standing to sue when '"(1) the individual members 
of the association have standing to sue; and (2) the nature of the claim and of the relief 
sought does not make the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to 
proper resolution of the cause.5" Id. {quoting Utah Rest. Ass fn v. Davis County Bd. of 
Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985) {quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 
S. Ct. 2197, 2211 (1975))). In reaching its decision, this Court, quoting 1he Utah 
Supreme Court, explained 
[Ajssociational standing has the advantage of permitting the prosecution of 
legitimate claims by an entity with the capacity to spread the costs of 
litigation among its members and to assume the burden incident to it, rather 
than requiring a single litigant to carry the entire load. To deny an 
association standing under such circumstances just might deter the assertion 
of valid claims without serving any countervailing public purpose. We 
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decline to take such a sterile approach to standing and adopt the test above 
[Warth v. Seldin] stated for determining an association's standing to sue. 
Id (quoting Utah Restaurant Ass 'n, 709 P.2d at 1163). 
The requirements set forth in Kabatznick have been satisfied. Specifically, the 
Restated Amended CC&Rs provide that an aggrieved owner may sue to enforce the 
CC&Rs, and the nature of the claims, i.e., enforcement of the Restated Amended CC&Rs 
and collection of assessments, does not require the participation of all Centennial Pointe 
owners. 
Moreover, the Restated Amended CC&Rs provide for the creation of an association to 
levy and collect assessments and to enforce the CC&Rs on behalf of the owners. (R. 
1113-19, 1135) Further, Ms. Onyeabor5s refusal to pay her assessment not only harms 
LEBR, but also Centennial Pointe's other owners who have also been forced to contribute 
to pay Ms. Onyeabor's unpaid share of the common expenses in order to keep the water 
and the lights on for the whole Centennial Pointe development. Finally, the rationale set 
forth in Kabatznick is particularly applicable in this matter as evidenced by the duration 
of this litigation and the voluminous pleadings. Accordingly, Ms. Onyeabor's standing 
argument fails. 
I. Ms. Onyeabor's Claim That the Restated Amended CC&Rs are Ambiguous 
Has Been Raised for the First Time on Appeal and Should Be Stricken. 
This Court should refuse to consider Ms. Onyeabor's argument that the Restated 
Amended CC&Rs are ambiguous. Ms. Onyeabor has raised this issue for the first time on 
appeal and without citation to the record. See James, 746 P.2d at 801; Utah R. App. P. 
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24. Ms. Onyeabor's argument is inadequately briefed. See Phillips, 904 P.2d at 1109. 
Ms. Onyeabor also continues to reassert her prior arguments, e.g., the Plat is invalid, the 
Restated Amended CC&Rs create of future easements, to support her presenl argument. 
Those arguments have been addressed and they fail. For these reasons, the Court should 
strike and not consider Ms. Onyeabor's arguments contained on pages 52-56. 
Assuming arguendo that the Court considers her argument, Ms. Onyeabor has not 
shown that the Restated Amended CC&Rs are ambiguous as a matter of law. Ms. 
Onyeabor's argument is incomplete and provides no analysis. See Onyeabor Brief at 52-
53. The provisions cited merely show that the Association is charged wilh maintaining 
the common areas, e.g., the parking lot. This task is accomplished through a 
nonexclusive easement over the common areas shared by all Centennial Pointe owners. 
Restated Amended CC&Rs (R. 1109-1110) Centennial Pointe owners are charged with 
maintaining their buildings and lots, e.g., keeping their buildings in a good and safe state 
of repair, as well as keeping the buildings and lots in a clean, sanitary and orderly 
condition. (R. 1111-12) Ms. Onyeabor does not explain or provide any analysis to show 
that these provisions are ambiguous, or how these provisions somehow render the 
Restated Amended CC&Rs invalid. Ms, Onyeabor's ambiguity argument fails. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED MS. ONYEABOR'S 
COUNTERCLAIMS FOR QUIET TITLE AND DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT. 
The trial court correctly determined that the Restated Amended CC&Rs are valid and 
encumber Ms. Onyeabor's Lots 1 and 2. Ms. Onyeabor's quiet title and declaratory 
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judgment were claims predicated upon the invalidity of the Restated Amended CC&Rs, 
i.e., the common areas identified and easements granted therein being terminated or 
invalid. (R. 730-32) Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking an Order 
from the trial court declaring that the Restated Amended CC&Rs are valid and encumber 
Ms. Onyeabor's property, placed Ms. Onyeabor's counterclaims directly at issue. Ms. 
Onyeabor had notice of Plaintiffs' Motion and the arguments therein, and an opportunity 
to argue that the Restated Amended CC&Rs were invalid and did not encumber her 
property, which she did. By declaring the Restated Amended CC&Rs valid, the trial 
court properly disposed of Ms. Onyeabor's inherently inconsistent counterclaims for quiet 
title and declaratory judgment. Accordingly, Ms. Onyeabor's due process argument fails. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED MS. ONYEABOR'S TRESPASS 
AND ASSAULT CLAIMS. 
Ms. Onyeabor has failed to proffer any facts or admissible evidence to show the trial 
court erred in denying her claims for trespass and assault. Ms. Onyeabor merely cites to 
the arguments in her Brief as support for her argument regarding these claims. Ms. 
Onyeabor has failed to adequately brief her argument, and her argument is conclusory at 
best. Ms. Onyeabor does not even address the elements of trespass or assault. This Court 
should refuse to consider Ms. Onyeabor's argument. See Phillips, 904 P.2d at 1109. That 
said, the undisputed facts and evidence proffered to the trial court show that neither 
LEBR nor third-party plaintiff Bruce Raile trespassed on Ms. Onyeabor's property. See 
Statement of Facts at 13-14, supra. They were privileged to enter onto the common areas 
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of Centennial Pointe pursuant to the reciprocal easement provided by both sets of 
CC&Rs. Ms. Onyeabor has proffered no facts or evidence to controvert the same. 
The undisputed facts and evidence proffered to the trial court show that Ms. 
Onyeabor's assault claims against LEBR and Mr. Raile failed as a matter of law. See id. 
at 12-14, supra. Ms. Onyeabor's conclusory argument does not address the elements of 
assault, nor has she proffered any facts or admissible evidence to controvert those 
proffered to the trial court. Accordingly, Ms. Onyeabor's arguments should be denied. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED MS. ONYEABOR'S 
CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS. 
Ms. Onyeabor has failed to proffer any facts or admissible evidence to show that the 
trial court erred by denying her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ms. 
Onyeabor relies upon inadmissible evidence to support her argument, specifically, 
inadmissible affidavits and her resume, and therefore her argument should not be 
considered. See Onyeabor Brief at 57. The undisputed facts show that Ms. Onyeabor's 
claim was premised upon "Mr. Raile talk[ing] down to [her]" and telling her that the 
parking area and landscaping areas in Centennial Pointe were common areas pursuant to 
the Restated Amended CC&Rs. See Statement of Facts at 12-14, supra. Ms. Onyeabor 
has not shown actual emotional distress. See id. Further, Ms. Onyeabor has failed to 
show that the conduct she complains of is outrageous or revulsive as a matter of law. See 
Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, \ 38, 56 P.3d 524. Ms. Onyeabor failed 
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to show that she satisfied the requirements necessary to sustain her claim. Accordingly, 
the trial court correctly determined that Ms. Onyeabor's claim failed as a matter of law. 
VII. MS. ONYEABOR'S CLAIM THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES FAILS. 
Ms. Onyeabor's argument on this point is incomplete and inadequately briefed. As 
such, the Court should refuse to consider it. See Phillips, 904 P.2d at 1109. Further, Ms. 
Onyeabor's argument fails because the Restated Amended CC&Rs provide for collection 
of attorney fees expended to enforce the Restated Amended CC&Rs. (R. 1115, 1135-36) 
The trial court ruled that the Restated Amended CC&Rs are valid and encumber Ms. 
Onyeabor's property. Accordingly, an award of attorney fees is appropriate and Ms. 
Onyeabor's argument fails. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REDUCING THE 
ASSOCIATION'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES BY AN ARBITRARY 
50%. 
The record in this matter shows that in prosecuting this case to and including 
Plaintiffs' dispositive Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Association's counsel 
performed the following work in this matter: (1) filed a Motion for a preliminary 
injunction against Ms. Onyeabor, which was granted; (2) conducted an evidentiary 
hearing that included proffering evidence and witness testimony, (3) defended against 
Ms. Onyeabor's counterclaims and third-party claims; (4) defended against two motions 
to dismiss; (5) drafted written discovery; (5) opposed a motion for protective order and 
filed a Motion to Compel when Ms. Onyeabor refused to sit for her deposition; (6) 
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conducted 3 depositions; (7) filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, with 17 
exhibits, including affidavits and deposition testimony; (8) opposed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment; and (9) filed several Motions to Strike pleadings and exhibits. 
Supplemental Affidavit of Edward T. Vasquez (R. 2017, 2019-25) Ms. Onyeabor has at 
times acted pro se in this matter as well as been represented by counsel. See id. (R. 2019) 
On May 3, 2007, the trial court, via Minute Entry (R. 1975), granted Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and awarded the Association their attorney's fees 
pursuant to the Restated Amended CC&Rs. See id. the Association's counsel filed with 
the trial court an affidavit of attorney fees that included redacted billing statements, 
showing that the attorney fees incurred were $136,589.00. (R. 2017, 2029, 2180-2205) 
In a Minute Entry dated August 7, 2007, the trial court determined that the attorney fees 
requested were "exorbitant" and reduced the award by an arbitrary 50%. (R. 2425) 
This Court reviews a trial court's determination of a reasonable attorneys fee for an 
abuse of discretion. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). A 
trial court evaluating evidence to determine reasonable attorney fees must consider (1) 
what legal work was actually performed; (2) how much work performed was reasonably 
necessary to adequately prosecute the matter; (3) whether the attorney's billing rate was 
consistent with rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services; and (4) 
whether circumstances, e.g., tactics such as filing multiple pleadings, and asserting 
inconsistent and unmeritorious positions, require the trial court to consider additional 
factors. See Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d 985, 990-92 (Utah 1988). 
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Plaintiffs' counsel provided the trial court with a detailed affidavit setting forth the 
basis for the attorney fees claimed. (R. 2017-25) The affidavit provided billing rates, the 
work performed, the challenges Plaintiffs' counsel experienced in addressing Ms. 
Onyeabor's pleadings, and the fact that she has employed different counsel and has at 
times acted pro se. (R. 2017-25) The trial court's ruling did not address the scope of the 
work performed, e.g., preliminary injunction, evidentiary hearing, motions to dismiss, 
discovery, motion to compel, prepare motion for summary judgment, reply memorandum, 
and motions to strike. (R. 2425-26) Further, the trial court provided no discussion or 
analysis to suggest that the work Plaintiffs' counsel performed was not reasonably 
necessary to adequately prosecute the matter. (R. 2425); See Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d 
at 990-92. The trial court did not address counsels' billing rates. The trial court provided 
no discussion or analysis of how it reached its decision that an exact 50% reduction 
would bring the fees "in line with what the Court considered] to be reasonable and 
justified." (R.2425-26) The record in this matter shows that the trial court did not 
analyze the claim for attorney fees under the factors set forth in Dixie State Bank, and that 
it abused its discretion by reducing the attorney fee award by an arbitrary 50%. 
Similar to the decision in American Vending Services, Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), the trial court's determination that Plaintiffs' fees were 
"exorbitant" is not sufficient to show that it conducted the Dixie State Bank analysis. See 
id. at 988. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling reducing the attorney fees award should 
be reversed and the Association awarded the attorney fees set forth in and supported by 
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Plaintiffs' counsel's attorney fee affidavit, specifically, $136,589.00, plus post judgment 
interest. Alternatively, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling and remand back 
to the trial court for determination of the award, in an amount not less than the attorney 
fees awarded, under the factors set forth in Dixie State Bank. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR 
LATE FEES AND FINES AUTHORIZED TO BE IMPOSED BY THE 
RESTATED AMENDED CC&RS. 
The trial court erred by denying Plaintiffs' claim for late fees and fines imposed 
against Ms. Onyeabor under the express provisions of the Restated Amended CC&Rs. 
The trial court denied Plaintiffs' on the basis that the late fees and fines "are not damages 
which have been sustained and suffered by the Plaintiffs due to Defendant's breach." (R. 
1976) The trial court's interpretation of restrictive covenants is a question of law. See 
Holladay, 2002 UT App 125 at ^ f 2. Appellate courts review a trial court's ruling on 
questions of law for correctness. See id. 
It is well-settled that restrictive covenants are interpreted in the same manner as 
contracts. See Id. Unambiguous restrictive covenants should be enforced as written. See 
id. {citing Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, ^ } 11, 998 P.2d 807). Further, recorded 
restrictive covenants are enforceable against property owners who purchased land 
'subject to' those covenants." Workman v. Brighton Props., Inc., 1999 UT 30, f 10, 976 
P.2d 1209. 
The trial court correctly determined that the Restated Amended CC&Rs are valid and 
encumber Ms. Onyeabor's property. The Restated Amended CC&Rs expressly provide 
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for late fees and fines for failure to timely pay assessments and violations of the CC&Rs. 
(R. 1117, 1136) These provisions are unambiguous contractual remedies for breach of 
contact, i.e., the CC&Rs, which should be enforced. Further, these provisions should be 
enforced because they deter property owners from imposing upon others in a PUD from 
being forced to subsidize them in order to keep the water and power on for all. In some 
circumstances, recovery of principal and interest may not be sufficient to compensate and 
protect from the harm of having to make an untimely "loan" by the paying of the 
assessments of a recalcitrant owner in addition to their own in order to keep the utilities 
on or the snow plowed from the parking lot. An owner's failure to pay their pro rata 
share of the common area expenses harms other owners and the owners association. 
These types of provisions seek to avoid this harm. 
The undisputed facts of this matter show that Ms. Onyeabor has violated the Restated 
Amended CC&Rs and refused to pay her assessment. Ms. Onyeabor has received the 
benefits of, inter alia, the common areas, water and sewer services, and snow removal, all 
the while she refusing to pay her assessments. Plaintiffs have been harmed by Ms. 
Onyeabor's conduct. The late fees and fines provide a remedy for this harm. The trial 
court erred when it denied Plaintiffs' claim for late fees and fines imposed under the 
Restated Amended CC&Rs. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
decision and remand back to the trial court to determine the amount of late fees and fines 
owing to Plaintiffs by Ms. Onyeabor. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs request that Ms. Onyeabor's appeal be denied in 
its entirety. Plaintiffs request that they be awarded their attorney fees on appeal, pursuant 
to the attorney fees provision in the Restated Amended CC&Rs, Rule 24(k) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and their request for attorney fees in their Opposition to 
Ms. Onyeabor's Motions for Summary Dispositions, which Motions this Court denied. 
See Plaintiffs' Opposition Motion dated February 2, 2008; see Order dated February 29, 
2008. 
Plaintiffs request that their Cross-Appeal be granted and that they be awarded the 
attorney fees requested in their counsel's attorney fee affidavit filed with the trial court. 
Alternatively, Plaintiffs request that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling reducing 
their attorney fee award and remand back to the trial court to determine a fee award 
pursuant to the factors set forth in Dixie State Bank. 
Plaintiffs request that the trial court's ruling denying Plaintiffs' claim for late fees and 
fines imposed against Ms. Onyeabor under the Restated Amended CC&Rs be reversed, 
and that Ms. Onyeabor be required to pay those late fees and fines owing to Plaintiffs as 
determined by the trial court on remand. 
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